Plato was the first philosopher to discover the metaphysical phenomenon of pluralsubjects and plural-predication; e.g. you and I are two, but neither you, nor I are two. I argue that Plato devised an ontology for plural-predication through his Theory of Forms, namely, plural-partaking in a Form. Furthermore, I argue that Plato used pluralpartaking to offer an ontology of related individuals without reifying relations. My contention is that Plato's theory of plural-relatives has evaded detection in the
Introduction
Plato's core metaphysical intuition is that transcendent properties -the Forms -are responsible for things being qualified in the way they are. These transcendent properties are universal in the sense that many individuals 'partake' in each of the transcendent properties, at a time. Partaking in any one Form qualifies the partaking individual with the property that Form is; thus, an individual is courageous by partaking in the Form of Courage. The intuition is that the property of courageousness comes to be present in the individual by partaking in the Form (however 'partaking' is interpreted ontologically).
Since each Form stands for a single property (it is monoeidic), partaking in a From qualifies the individual with that property.
An ontological theory needs to account for, not only qualified individuals, but also for related individuals. Related individuals have been a thorny issue for Plato's Theory of Forms, because the theory does not prima facie seem to be designed to offer an ontology of related individuals, since it, strikingly, does not contain any relational Forms.
Nevertheless, Plato was aware of the need for an explanation, and so did attempt to account for related individuals through his Theory of Forms. What I aim to show in the present paper is that, in fact, his account of related individuals is a unique and philosophically deeply insightful account, despite the fact that it has evaded recognition the history of metaphysics.
Plato's solution could not have been the introduction of relational Forms in his ontology. This is because partaking in a Form qualifies an individual only with the property the Form stands for. But asymmetric relations, such as the mother-daughter relation, involve the qualification of two (or more) individuals with different properties each. There could be no Form partaking in which would qualify different individuals with different properties, e.g. no 'maternal relational' Form, such that if two individuals partook of it, one individual would be qualified as mother, and the other as offspring.
I will argue that Plato solves the problem of related individuals in his Theory of Forms by using his theory of plural-partaking in Forms, which he developed in one of his early dialogues, the Hippias Major. On his account of plural-predication, two or more individuals can partake in a Form as plural-subjects, and come to be jointly qualified by a single instance of the property of the Form; e.g. Michael and George, acting jointly, are courageous. Remarkably Plato was insightful enough to see and show in his theory that this does not make Michael courageous, or George courageous, but only both of them together courageous. Plato will exploit plural-partaking to explain how related objects acquire their relational qualifications, rather than introduce relations as additional entities between individuals. The related individuals share a monadic property instance in symmetric cases, or a pair of property instances in asymmetric cases. Neither the shared property nor the shared pair of properties are relational bridges between the plural-subjects, but a qualification of the subjects like any monadic qualification of an object. The subjects are conjoined in sharing this instance of a property, which is attained by the joint-partaking in the Form (dictated by the relativising context, as in being equal to, or greater than, etc.). The joint partaking does not turn the subjects into one, but retains the plurality of the subjects. Rather than requiring the oneness of the subjects, plural-partaking furnishes the sharing of the instance of the property between the subjects, which perform jointly the metaphysical function of partaking. We shall first turn to Plato's theory of plural subjects and pluralpartaking in Forms, and then come to examine (symmetrically and asymmetrically) related individuals through plural-partaking.
Plural Subjects and Plural-partaking in Platonic Forms
In Plato's dialogue Hippias Major, the sophist Hippias, in his exchange with Socrates, claims there is no plural predication:
'Never shall you find what is attributed to neither me nor you, but is attributed to both of us. If both of us were just, wouldn't each of us be too? Or if each of us were unjust, wouldn't both of us? Or if we were healthy, wouldn't each be? … You Socrates think there's some attribute or being that is true of these both but not of each, or of each but not of both. And how could that be, Socrates? That when neither has an attribute, whatever it may be, this attribute -which belongs to neither -could belong to both? … …whatever both are, each is as well; and whatever each is, both are.' (Hippias Major 300d7-301e5) I take Hippias' position to be that the many are f if and only if each of the many is f. I take this position to be the rejection of plural-predication, in the way that such predication is described by Hippias and ascribed to Socrates by him. For Hippias there is no shared attribute between the many over and above the individual possessions of attributes by each of the many; their collective qualification reduces to individual qualifications; I shall call this distributive-predication. Things are qualified in a particular way if they are each so qualified, and vice versa.
Socrates agrees that there are cases like the ones that Hippias mentions. But additionally, Socrates puts forward counterexamples to Hippias' theory and proposes an account that offers the ontology required for his counterexamples. The difference between the accounts is that Socrates does not reduce, in all cases, the collective qualification of the many to their individual possessions of that attribute, as Hippias does. Socrates allows for two further types of qualification. For him, an attribute can belong to all the many for independent reasons than it belongs to each of the many, or it may even not belong to each of the many at all; the instance of the attribute which is shared by the many is different from any instance that may belong to each of the many.
So there are three types of predication: one distributive (Hippias'), and two plural ones (Socrates'). The distributive one is when the many are collectively qualified simply because each of the many possesses that attribute; the plural ones are, first, when an attribute is shared by all the many in addition to each of the many possessing that attribute; and second, when an attribute is shared by all the many while none of the many possesses that attribute. But for simplicity's sake I will divide them into two only camps, one where the many are qualified and each of the many is also qualified, and one where the many are qualified but each of the many is not (or vice versa). (So I will not systematically distinguish between the many being qualified because each is qualified, and the many being qualified because they share an instance of the attribute over and above each possessing that attribute. The Platonic text also sets up the debate as a dichotomy rather than a trichotomy, for starkness of opposition between the two theories.) So Hippias and Socrates agree that when each of the many is f, then all are f, too; they disagree on whether the many can be f when none of the many is f. whatever is true of both is also true of each, and that whatever is true of each is also true of both. This example makes it clear that Hippias does not have the distributive way out here.
Even if we could say that David and Susan are one (not 'two'), it would not be true to conclude from this that David is one and Susan is one in the same sense of 'one' as each is one. The predicate 'one' in these statements means something different; in the former it may mean something like 'inseparable between them', while in the latter it would mean 'one human being'. Neither is the predication 'they are two' distributive; David is not two, nor is Susan, despite the fact that they are two.
Socrates' initial counterexample to Hippias' assumption about distributive predication, namely the example of 'being two persons', is the simplest to examine. Each of Socrates and Hippias is a human being, while they are two human beings. The attribute of being 'two' belongs to them, but not to each of them; it is instantiated only in Socrates and Hippias together. It is the context that makes them two, the context of considering Hippias and Socrates and no other. In this context they, no more and no fewer, are two.
The Metaphysics of the Socratic Position
Socrates' metaphysical account of plural predication is explicit. In plural-predication the predicated attribute belongs to all the subjects together; this belonging is not reducible to, nor does it need to be grounded on that very attribute belonging to the each of the individual subjects; Plato says: 'when each of them is inexpressible, both together may be expressible, or possibly inexpressible' (Hipp. Maj. 303b7-c1). If they are expressible together, this is not grounded on individual expressibility if each of them is inexpressible. Let us further consider two colours; each is attractive, and both together unattractive. Hippias could hold that we are justified in saying that the colours are attractive (in a distributive sense), since each is attractive. But it is also true that juxtaposed together, the colours are unattractive. The attribute of being unattractive belongs to them together, but does not belong to each individually, contra Hippias. This is what is distinctive of the Socratic position: his metaphysics allows that several individuals together can be the subjects of a single instance of an attribute ('unattractive'), which may not be instantiated in each individual; and an attribute instantiated in each individual ('attractive') may not be instantiated jointly in all of them together (although it can be collectively attributed to them in a distributive (Hippian) way). A plural instantiation can coexist, as a different instantiation of an attribute, with instances of the same attribute in each of the subjects, as when each colour is attractive, but also, they are all attractive, too; or, it can coexist with its opposite, as when the colours are unattractive together, despite each of them being attractive; in such a case, each colour possesses an attribute (attractiveness) which they do not possess together, and they possess an attribute together (unattractiveness) which neither of them possesses by itself.
This ontological independence of plural-predication from individual-predication is just
what Hippias denied when he said: 'how could that be, Socrates? That any state of being, whatever, could be attributed to neither, since that attribute, which is attributed to neither, is attributed to both? ' (300b6-8) . Socrates does have an answer; he says that 'it was by the being that adheres to both, if both are [f] …-it was by that they had to be shared by a number of subjects; the instance is literally shared between the subjects; they co-possess it; they co-own that instance of the attribute. I do not use the terms 'part-own', or 'part-possess', as they may mislead by suggesting that there are parts of the attribute, each of which is fully possessed by each of the subjects respectively.
3 A plurally shared attribute belongs to each individual subject differently than the way that that attribute would belong to any one of these subjects if fully possessed by that subject alone. Shared ownership involves only all the sharing-subjects together possessing the attribute. It is like a statue being supported by two pillars. The statue is not partitioned so that one part of it stands on one pillar, and the other part on the second; nor does the statue stand on the first pillar, or even on the second; rather, the statue stands as a whole on the two pillars. Without both pillars, the statue would fall; the whole statue would fall, not just part of it. In an alternative setup, the statue could be supported by several pillars and not fall by the removal of one or more of them, but only come to be fully supported by fewer of them. Similarly with the many owners of an instance of an attribute. In the case of their being 'two people', the loss of one would be detrimental to the plural-instantiation of that attribute, but if they are so many as to form 'a crowd', the loss of one would not undermine the plural-predication of 'a crowd'.
For Socrates, qualifications can come to belong to particular things in two ways, the way Hippias described, distributively, but also the way Hippias denied, plurally 
Related Individuals in Plato's Theory of Forms

Plato's Theory of Forms is designed to offer the metaphysics of predication by showing
what it is for an object to be qualified in any way. An object is f by partaking in the Form of F-ness:
'Is there or is there not an absolute justice? Assuredly there is.
And an absolute beauty and absolute good? Of course.' (Phaedo 65d4-8)
'They agreed that each of the abstract qualities exists and that other things which participate in these get their names from them.' (Phaedo 102a10-b)
The individuals get their names from them, but also they become like the Form in which they partake:
'... if there is anything beautiful besides Beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beauty. ... nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beauty we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all things are made beautiful by Beauty.'
(Phaedo 100c4-d8) Forms are transcendent entities, which, notoriously, makes partaking in them a theoretically challenging problem for the theory. But this will not be our concern here.
It is a different aspect of the Forms that is of direct interest in our present inquiry,
namely, what it is that a Form can offer to an individual that partakes in it, however the partaking is achieved. This does not mean that a Form has no further properties. It means that there is a single property that a Form stands for, which is the only property it can endow to its partakers.
The same is true when plural-subjects partake together in a Form; the partaking endows the subjects with a single instance, of a single attribute -the one the Form stands forwhich belongs jointly to these subjects together. Thus, an individual or individuals partaking in a Form will be qualified with the kind that Form is, namely the single property that constitutes the Form, e.g. Justice, Beauty, Goodness, Heat, Smallness etc.
Joint ownership of an instance of a property is like joint ownership of a book -there is only one book but more than one owners of it.
There are two problems that arise for a theory of related individuals based on the ontology of the Theory of Forms. The first is that qualifying a partaker does not relate the partaker to anything; and the second is that each Form can qualify its partaker(s) with a single qualification, while asymmetric relations qualify their relata with different qualifications.
I find the monoeidic (uni-form) character of the Forms to be the determining factor for whatever treatment of asymmetrically related objects can be given in Plato's ontology. What is significant for our own purposes in this description is that the partaking in Largeness or Smallness is temporary and contextual. Simmias' largeness surpasses the smallness of Socrates, while his smallness is surpassed by the largeness of Phaedo.
What Plato is emphasising is that the presence of largeness or smallness in an individual is circumstantial, and dictated not by the individual's nature, but by the context. The contextuality of the relative qualifications is expressed in Plato's theory, not in a relation between Opposite Forms, but in the joint-partaking by the two individuals (which is developed in what follows).
Symmetrically related individuals: the Form of Equality
I read Plato in the conventional and common sense way of understanding the Form of Equality just like all other Forms, as a single transcendent property rather than as two equal entities. 5 What is it, then, for a thing to be equal? It can only be equal to another thing, which, too, is equal to the first. But how is this to be explained in terms of the Theory of Forms? Plato does not discuss this explicitly, but one can surmise its ontology from similar cases that are discussed by him.
It is the relativity and contextuality of the equality between two individuals which invites comparison to Plato's treatment of similarly relative cases of qualification;
specifically, that of being two, or of some objects being attractive or harmonious together. We saw above that Plato's explanation of Socrates and Hippias being two is that they both share the qualification of being two, which we explained in the Theory of Forms by the plural-partaking of the individuals in in the Form of Two. Further, Plato's explanation of two objects looking beautiful together is that they share the qualification of beauty, for which they need to plurally-partake in the Form of Beauty. We have seen that what is particular about such partaking is that the individuals partake together, namely, they share a single instance of the Form's property. Thus, it is not Socrates that is two and Hippias that is two, but only both of them together bear the property of twoness. Similarly, e.g., these objects are, by hypothesis, beautiful together. Let us consider two individuals which are beautiful together, but not singly. How does this qualification differ in type from two individuals which are equal together? I suggest that they are the same type of qualification, and that this is a different way of conceiving of relations than the way in which they have traditionally been understood. We are accustomed to thinking of relations as 'arches' between objects. Could it be that Plato did not think of them in this way? Could it be that he thought of two equal individuals as being qualified together as equal? That he thought that the way they relate to each other does not connect them, but qualifies them in some way? Is this how we, too, think of individuals when we classify them into equivalence classes -for example, all Astudents? Are A-students related to one another, or jointly qualified?
Consider things that are beautiful, and things that are equal, where none of them is beautiful or equal on its own. The beautiful things are beautiful because of how they each relate aesthetically to the other; the equal things are equal because of how they each relate quantitatively to the other. And yet we do not think of being beautiful as a relation. It is possible that this is how Plato thought of related individuals, namely as group-qualifications of individuals which together are f, even is none of them is f individually. Consider individuals which are heavy (for the elevator), and individuals which are equal. Their weights, each weight with the other weights, ground the individuals' heaviness in the one case, and their (say) sizes ground their equality, to each other, in the second. The individuals which are heavy are plurally heavy; doesn't this make the equals plurally equal?
One may remark on the difference between the equals being equal to each other, while heavy things being heavy with each other. But the question is not whether they are differently related, which is not disputable; rather, it is whether they are qualified with categorically different types of qualification (as relational, and non-relational). Their difference seems irrelevant for the categorical classification of the qualification: are two harmonious sounds harmonious in relation 'to' one another, or are they harmonious 'with' one another? More generally, we do not think that 'over', 'in', 'on the side of', 'with', etc., signal different ontological categories of the respective qualifications. Why should the difference between 'to' and 'with' signify a categorical difference of the respective qualifications? I suggest that it does not, and that Plato did not see, e.g., being two (with one another) as a categorically different type of qualification than being equal (to one another).
The intuition that Plato develops is that we can capture the dependence of related individuals, not by connecting them through 'bridges' between them, i.e. relations, but by their joint partaking which results in their sharing a qualification. A shared qualification introduces the oneness of the qualification which is owned by more subjects than one, and which embodies the dependence between the subjects. Their dependence results from the requirement that the partaking that will secure such a qualification for them all needs to be joint partaking. Joint partaking represents dependence, even in less conspicuously relational plural qualifications such as being two, or beautiful (together), or harmonious, or heavy, or equal, etc. when one adds hot and cold water together one gets lukewarm water. This means that the difference between the opposites is reduced to a difference of value and strength, rather than a difference of quality. Generalising, the difference between opposites is a difference of the quantity in a qualitative common scale between them, which allows for opposites to be compared and to overpower one another. This presupposed common qualitative ground, which reduces the difference between Opposite Forms to quantity, is the key to plural-partaking in Opposite Forms; and it sets Opposite Forms apart from non-Opposite Forms which differ qualitatively between them.
Asymmetrically related individuals
The ontology of asymmetrically related individuals is, expectedly, more complex than of symmetrically related ones, but I suggest that they are handled by Plato in the same A single qualification results from this plural-partaking, namely 'a large-small qualification' of the plural subjects Simmias and Socrates; the two qualifications of the two objects are a shared qualification because of the relativity and interdependence between the qualifications, which gives them a kind of oneness.
But it cannot be full-blown oneness because the asymmetry of the 'large-small' qualification presents a problem for the nature of the qualification. For full-blown oneness, a single property would need to somehow do the work of two properties(?).
Instead, Plato develops an account where there are two qualifications, resulting from two properties -Forms -which are interdependently determined.
There is an indication that Plato saw the relativity of opposites, when it arises, as Plato's theory of related individuals has not attracted much discussion in the exegetical tradition. More recently, there was a focused discussion of Castaneda's reading of Plato on relations (Castaneda 1972, and 1978) , which triggered responses and criticisms by Gallop (1976 ), McPherran (1983 , and Matthen (1984). Castaneda's reading is fundamentally different from the present one, in so far as he premises it on a position that is antithetical to my position here, but also, a position I have argued is not Platonic.
Castaneda's theory is based on the claim that: 'All Forms are monadic, i.e., each Form is instantiated only by one particular in each fact it is involved in: no Form is ever instantiated by pairs or other n-tuples, whether ordered or not.' (Castaneda 1972, 471) . This is a flat denial of the possibility of plural-partaking in a Form, which I have shown to be contradicted by Plato's account of plural-subjects.
One apparent similarity between Castaneda's interpretation and the present one is that he holds that related individuals partake of chained-Forms, e.g. Hot-Cold. But for Castaneda, nothing can partake of the Cold alone. Rather it must do so while something else partakes of the Hot. This has several ontological consequences for the Forms, which Matthen (1984) has itemised in his criticisms of Canstaneda's account. But the starkest problem I find in Castaneda's reading is that he avoids positing relations between things in the world only at the cost of introducing relations at the level of the Forms -relations which chain some Forms together, and which are not explained by the Theory of Forms.
Apart from the explanatory gap this generates, it is also antithetical to Castaneda's claim that Platonic Forms are monadic. Castaneda says:
'Plato (as does my [Castaneda's] general theory) reduces relations to special sets of monadic Forms, but does not reduce relational facts to non-relational facts. … Thus, it can be said that Plato (as well as my general theory) assimilates relations to monadic properties or qualities -in making them all monadic -even though he distinguishes (as I do) between the non-relational monadic properties, which can be participated in by particulars in isolation, and the relational ones, which cannot be participated in except in company, with respect to the partakings of other Forms.' (Castaneda 1978, 41, 
